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The following is an abridged version of the Coffin Memorial Lecture 
on the History of Ideas given earlier this year at the IALS.
Dr Carsten Smith, the Chief Justice of Norway (and an 
Honorary Fellow of SALS), delivered the University of London 
Annual Coffin Memorial Lecture on the History of Ideas at the 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies on 3 April 2000. He spoke 
about 'Judicial Review of Parliamentary Legislation: Norway as a 
European Pioneer'. The Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, 
Lord WoolfofBarnes, chaired the lecture. Many other senior judges 
and leading academics attended, including Lord Goff, Lord Slynn, 
Lord Nolan, Lord Hope and Lord Justice Mummery.
Chief Justice Smith was introduced by Lord Chief Justice Woolf. 
Chief Justice Smith served as the President of the Norwegian 
Supreme Court for a decade. Before that he established an 
international reputation as an academic in banking law. He was 
one of the youngest academics ever appointed to a professorial chair 
at the University of Oslo and his scholarship also covered 
international and human rights law. An article written by the
young professor about the Supreme Court, human rights and the 
Constitution caused much comment, not all of it positive, from the 
then judges of the Supreme Court. He developed his views in the
following years and for the last 10 years in the Supreme Court.
Whether it would have developed the same way without Chief 
Justice Smith as a member of the Court is a matter outsiders cannot 
know, but the views of the young professor have certainly been 
accepted by the Norwegian courts.
As a professor Dr Smith was often called upon as a one-person 
Supreme Court. The government sought his advice on important 
matters relating to the constitution, minority rights and banking. 
He is internationally known for the work he did for the Sami 
minority populating the north of Norway. One outcome of his 
recommendations is a new provision of the Norwegian Constitution 
about the rights of the Sami. Another is the Sami Parliament.
Lord Woolf pointed out that the experiences with judicial review 
in Norway had a particular relevance in the UK today, at the time 
of the entry into force of the Human Rights Act 1998. Norway 
had established judicial review of parliamentary legislation before 
any other European country. Recent Norwegian case law on the 
status of international and European law would also be of interest.
Below follow excerpts from Chief Justice Smith's lecture.
THE HISTORY OF A LEGAL CONCEPT
My subject is the history of a legal concept which spread 
throughout Europe   and the world at large   in the latter 
half of the twentieth century, but which had already grown 
roots in Norway a century earlier. It is the idea that law, as 
applied by the courts, shall function as a check upon 
parliamentary power./
The authority and the duty of the courts to set aside 
statutes on the ground that they violate provisions of the
constitution of a country   to act as guardian of the 
constitution   represent a safeguard for individuals and 
minorities whose views have not prevailed in the political 
arena. There are various terms used for this constitutional 
law concept, which I shall here refer to as judicial review.
This review applies first and foremost to the protection 
of human rights as formulated in a national constitution. 
In his play 'An Enemy of the People' of 1882, the 11
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Norwegian dramatist Henrik Ibsen voiced the familiar 
maxim that the minority is always right. But prior to that, 
Norway's Supreme Court had already drawn its own, and 
somewhat more balanced, judicial conclusions.
Norway's Constitution dates from 1814 when the four 
hundred year old union with Denmark was dissolved. It is 
the oldest written constitution in Europe still in effect 
today. The Constitution makes no explicit mention of 
judicial review, quite in conformity with European 
constitutional thinking of that period. This review arose 
during the following decades from the practice of the 
Norwegian Supreme Court itself.
As a precursor to the review of legislation the Supreme 
Court established in its first few years the principle that 
decisions of the executive branch could be declared null 
and void by the courts of law. The motivation was simple 
but forceful: it was stated that there must be some place 
to which citizens can turn to have the errors of the 
authorities rectified.
The right also to review the legislature evolved in two 
different but interrelated stages. The initial stage consisted 
of the courts adopting the Constitution as an instrument 
of true legal norms, not merely political guidelines, but 
rules which could be applied in court decisions as 
supplementing ordinary statutes and other norms of law. 
A key factor in this regard was the extremely positive 
status of the Constitution in Norwegian popular opinion 
in the years following 1814. It was the prime symbol of 
the country's new-found independence, highly praised by 
poets and politicians, so why should not Norwegian 
judges also treat it with great respect? Once this stance 
had become firmly rooted, it was not a long next step to 
regard the relationship between the Constitution and 
statutory law as a regular legal relationship between a 
superior rule and a subordinate one.
The first breakthrough internationally occurred in 1803 
with the US Supreme Court's decision mMarbury v Madison 
1 Cranch 137, which represents one of the landmark cases 
in Western legal thinking. The closest comparable 
Norwegian decision was a case between a naval officer and 
the naval authorities of 1866. Public voting was introduced
o
in the Supreme Court only two years previously, and even 
if some decisions might be considered as forerunners, this 
case is our first example of a publicised judgment in which 
the principle of judicial review was clearly applied.
The case in question pertained to legislation requiring 
naval officers in certain positions to keep up-to-date lists 
of crew members without receiving any remuneration for 
this task. This was found to be incompatible with the 
Constitution. The Supreme Court awarded compensation 
to the disgruntled officer by four votes to three.
In the Norwegian Supreme Court, each judge has to 
pronounce an individual vote with reasoning. It was the 
Chief Justice who in the final and decisive vote raised the
issue of judicial review and gave the answer in the most 
unambiguous way, namely,
'that inasmuch as the courts of law cannot be required to 
judge according to both laws simultaneously, they must 
necessarily give priority to the Constitution'.
Norway's Supreme Court was apparently the first court 
in Europe to establish these kinds of judicial review 
powers. At around the same time Switzerland was starting 
to review the legislation of the cantons vis-a-vis the 
Constitution, but this review did not include federal 
legislation.
o
The Norwegian practice started in a period of political 
trend towards parliamentary rule, which was introduced 
in the 1880s. Historians have maintained that the new 
power of the Supreme Court should be regarded as a 
political move to substitute the Court for the independent 
government in the role as conservative guarantor, since 
the government now was in the process of losing its 
independent position in relation to Parliament. The 
sources are, however, scarce to evaluate this introduction 
of judicial review from a political point of view. In the 
judicial opinions of the Court one finds naturally only 
strictly legal language.
It is probable that the Norwegian judges at the time were 
aware of the American practice, although this is by no means 
certain. What is more certain is that our constitutional 
adjudication remained a relatively well-kept secret in an 
international perspective, effectively protected by linguistic 
barriers. In international literature on judicial review, 
Norwegian practice is very much an unknown quantity.
The next step internationally was the establishment of 
the Austrian constitutional court which was set up in 1920 
at the instigation of the renowned legal scholar Hans 
Kelsen. Further development was of minor significance 
until after the Second World War, but when it came, it 
came hard and fast. After 1945 Germany and Italy set up 
similar courts, followed by a widespread blossoming of 
successive constitutional courts throughout Europe, 
particularly after the fall of the communist regimes. 
Powers of judicial review have also been introduced in 
other countries around the globe, in specialist courts or 
ordinary courts, in varying degrees.
In a Nordic context, the Norwegian jurisdiction stood 
out as a unique principle. Iceland had its national 
breakthrough in 1943, Denmark last year, whereas 
Sweden and Finland are still hesitating.
o
The concept of judicial review in Norway was created in 
the 19th century on the American model, and was 
modernised in the 20th century by adapting the preferred 
position principle to Norwegian conditions. This begs the 
question as to whether in the present century we will also 
dare to emulate the most recent practice adopted by the 
US Supreme Court   the application of non-textual 
constitutional rights.
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The seed of this latest development can be traced back to 
the 1960s, when for instance Harlan J spoke of the larger 
context of constitutional provisions, defining that context as 
one 'not of words, but of history and purposes'. The major 
breakthrough for such reasoning came with Roe v Wade 4100
o o
US 113 in 1973. In that case the Supreme Court found that 
the Constitution recognised a general 'right to privacy'   
despite the fact that this is not explicitly stated in any of the 
constitutional articles   and moreover, that this 'right' must 
also be understood as widely as including the right to 
terminate a pregnancy.
But this is the line of constitutional thinking which also 
meets the greatest resistance. As Judge Robert Bork 
aphoristically put it:
'The truth is that the judge who looks outside the historic 
Constitution always looks inside himself and nowhere else.'
The idea of extrapolating implicit constitutional rights 
remains removed from the Norwegian concept so far. The 
Supreme Court has nonetheless tested these waters, although 
with extreme caution. Certain rulings have been worded 
carefully to allow future statutes to be set aside should they 
violate certain general legal principles of a fundamental 
nature. But at the same time it has been emphasised that this 
could only, if ever, be applicable in 'extreme cases'.
Most of the supplementation of the Constitution which 
would concur with Norwegian thinking can be achieved by 
applying the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the two United Nations Covenants. It is probable that these 
may present the Norwegian courts with some of their 
greatest legal challenges in the near future.
As a few concluding observations based on around a 150
o
years of judicial review, I should like to draw particular 
attention to certain points.
Firstly, on the legal basis: the principle was established long 
ago by constitutional customary law, according to the most
common view in legal theory, which means that the principle 
can only be eliminated by a highly improbable amendment to 
the Constitution.
Second, on the democratic viewpoint: in the Norwegian 
debate on judicial review, the image has been used of a 
spanner thrown in the works of democracy. Admittedly, 
judicial review will necessarily entail a curtailment of the 
will of the parliamentary majority at a given moment. But 
judicial review does not always work in a conservative 
direction. It can also have a reforming effect, not least in 
protecting freedom of speech.
Third, on the organisation of the court system: judicial 
review can be carried out in a satisfactory manner through 
the ordinary courts, thereby avoiding splits in the court 
system, and reducing the risk of politicising the process. In 
the ordinary courts, as opposed to separate constitutional 
courts, judicial review will be implemented by judges 
whose main duties are ordinary application of the law, 
ensuring to a large degree that they apply recognised 
judicial methodology.
Fourth, on the range of the principle: judicial review can 
be carried out in a sober manner   more cautiously than 
for instance in the US   while still remaining an active part 
of the check and balance system in the public sector of the 
country. At the same time, the principle can be applied in 
such a way as to afford particularly strong protection to 
fundamental human rights.
o
And finally, on the history of the idea: even though the 
principle has encountered resistance at times, both in 
Parliament and in public debate, it has slowly taken root 
over the generations as an important element in the three 
branches of government. Thus judicial review shows   
according to Norwegian thinking   that the nation is not 
merely a democracy', but a democracy which in the last 
resort has a special institutional guarantee for the rule of 
law. ©
One Day Historical Seminar
Saturday 2 December 2000
Politics and Judiciary in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century 
England
Speakers: DR CHRISTOPHER BROOKS, Reader, 
Department of History, University of Durham: Law, 
judges and politics in early Stuart England; DR MIKE 
MACNAIR, Fellow, St Hugh's College, Oxford: Locke, 
the constitution and the law of property in early eighteenth 
century Whig legal thought; DR ROSE MELIKAN, 
Fellow, St Catherine's College, Cambridge: Master of the 
House? Parliament and the Master of the Rolls during the
reign of George HI; PROFESSOR DAVID EEMMINGS, 
Department of History, University of Newcastle, 
Australia: Rethinking judicial independence in eighteenth 
century England.
The above seminar will take place from 11 am - 4pm 
at the IALS. It costs £8.00 per head (which includes 
lunch and refreshments), but some places are available 
free of charge. Those wishing to attend should contact 
contact Belinda Crothers at the Institute of Advanced 
Legal Studies (tel: 020 7862 5841; 
email: bcrother@sas.ac.uk) as soon as possible.
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